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INTRODUCTION
The standards for judging exclusive dealing arrangements have un-
dergone substantial modification in recent years, but remain in need of
considerable refinement. Exclusive dealing is one of the most common
practices within the sweep of the antitrust laws, yet because it is marked
by apparent contradictions, it is also one of the most misunderstood. It
is a vertical restraint, but unlike territorial or customer restraints it lim-
its purchasing rather than resale. It is the converse of a resale restraint,
limiting interbrand competition, but not intrabrand competition.' It
normally is governed by the broadly worded illegality standard of sec-
j Partner in the law firm of Kaye, Scholer, Fierman, Hays & Handler, New York, New
York. The author gratefully acknowledges the valuable assistance of John D. Chapman in
the preparation of this article.
1 Interbrand competition is "competition among the manufacturers of the same generic
product." Intrabrand competition is competition among distributors "of the product of a
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tion 3 of the Clayton Act,2 rather than the narrower standard of the
Sherman Act, 3 but in contrast to tying, which section 3 also governs, it
never has been subject to per se illegality.
4
"Exclusive dealing," as defined in the legal literature, is a restric-
tion that a supplier imposes on a customer, forbidding the customer
from purchasing some category of products from any other supplier.
5
Necessarily, it forecloses other suppliers from selling those products to
the customer, but it can also increase efficiency and promote competi-
tion.6 Suppliers frequently employ exclusive dealing to restrain whole-
salers and retailers, although they may also impose it upon end-users of
their products. 7 This article considers only exclusive dealing provisions
involving distributors, both wholesalers and retailers, and explains that
they warrant special analysis, including consideration of factors as yet
unexamined by the courts.
The Federal Trade Commission's decision in Beltone Electronics
Corp. 8 is the most recent analytical bench mark on this subject. Prior
cases judged exclusive dealing by counting the number of dealers in a
particular manufacturer." Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 52 n. 19
(1977).
2 15 U.S.C. § 14 (1982).
3 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1982).
4 Exclusive dealing has persistently suffered from mislabeling, often being confused
with "exclusive dealerships" (also known as "exclusive distributorships" or simply as "exclu-
sives"). Exclusive dealerships actually are restraints upon suppliers, not distributors, prohibit-
ing suppliers from appointing more than one distributor within a defined territory. See ABA
ANTITRUST SECTION, MONOGRAPH No. 9, REFUSALS TO DEAL AND EXCLUSIVE DISTRIBU-
TORSHIPS 25-34 (1983). Exclusive dealerships do not in themselves limit the distributors, al-
though they are frequently coupled with territorial restraints to keep the dealers out of each
other's exclusive territories. The economics and business literature have also confused these
terms.
5 A variation of exclusive dealing is the "requirements contract," which binds the cus-
tomer to purchase all or part of its requirements from a particular supplier, and the supplier
to fulfill those requirements.
6 In Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293, 306-07 (1949), hereinafter re-
ferred to as the Standard Stations case, Justice Frankfurter observed that
[r]equirements contracts. . . may well be of economic advantage to buy-
ers as well as to sellers, and thus indirectly of advantage to the consuming
public. . . . From the seller's point of view, requirements contracts may
make possible the substantial reduction of selling expenses, give protection
against price fluctuations, and-of particular advantage to a newcomer to the
field to whom it is important to know what capital expenditures are justi-
fied-offer the possibility of a predictable market. See Stockhausen, The Com-
mercial and Anti-Tust Aspects of Tern Requirements Contracts, 23 N.Y.U.L.Q.
REv. 412, 413-14 (1948). They may be useful, moreover, to a seller trying to
establish a foothold against the counterattacks of entrenched competitors.
See general4y P. AREEDA, ANTITRUST ANALYSIS 810-13 (3d ed. 1982); Lockhart & Sacks, The
Relevance ofEconomic Factors in Determining Whether Exclusive Arrangements Violate Section 3 of the
Clayton Act, 65 HARv. L. REv. 913, 923-31 (1952).
7 Tampa Elec. Co. v. Nashville Coal Co., 365 U.S. 320 (1961), involving a "require-
ments contract," is the leading example of imposition of exclusive dealing on an end-user.
8 [1979-83 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 21,934 (F.T.C. 1982).
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market foreclosed from carrying the goods of competing suppliers, and
by totaling those dealers' annual sales. The Beltone decision calls for a
broader and more meaningful inquiry, weighing the procompetitive ef-
fects against the anticompetitive effects, and incorporating the economic:
principles that the Supreme Court recognized in Continental T V, Inc. v.
GTE Sylvania Inc. 9 However, although Beltone advanced the analysis of
exclusive dealing in distribution appreciably, it did not fully explain the
differences between the analysis applied in Sylvania, which involved a
type of territorial restraint, and the analysis that exclusive dealing ar-
rangements require.
This article will demonstrate that the procompetitive and anticom-
petitive effects of exclusive dealing differ from those of territorial re-
straints and other vertical restrictions. It will argue that there are
important variables, not fully explored in Beltone, which should figure
prominently in any analysis of exclusive dealing arrangements between
suppliers and distributors. The article will examine each of these vari-




Although exclusive dealing has been the subject of antitrust litiga-
tion throughout this century, relatively few of the vertical restraint cases
decided over the past few years have addressed it. Historically, exclusive
dealing has been a violation in search of a standard-subject to a crazy
quilt of statutes and analytical approaches. Section 3 of the Clayton
Act,10 section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, " and, when
"commodities" are not involved, section 1 of the Sherman Act, each
may govern exclusive dealing. 12 As already noted, exclusive dealing
does not fit the pattern of other vertical restraints, and can have unique
effects upon competition. The treatment of exclusive dealing by the
courts and the Federal Trade Commission has reflected these ambigui-
9 433 U.S. 36 (1977). The Sylvania test is discussed in: Bork, Vertical Restraints.- Schwinn
Overruled, 1977 Sup. CT. REV. 171 (1978); Handler, Changing Trends in Antitrust Doctrines.- An
Unprecedented Supreme Court Term-1977, 77 COLUM. L. REv. 979, 980-89 (1977); Pitofsky, The
Sylvania Case: Antitrust Analysis of Non-Price Vertical Restrictions, 78 COLUM. L. Rav. 1 (1978);
Posner, The Rule of Reason and the Economic Approach.- Refctions on the Sylvania Decision, 45 U.
CHI. L. REv. 1 (1977); Steuer, Bfyond Sylvania: Reason Returns to Vertical Restraints, 47 ANTI-
TRUST L.J. 1007 (1979).
10 15 U.S.C. § 14 (1982).
11 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1982).
12 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1982). Cases not involving "commodities" have applied the Sherman
Act. See American Motor Inns, Inc. v. Holiday Inns, Inc., 521 F.2d 1230, 1250 (3d Cir. 1975).
Section 3 of the Clayton Act applies only to "commodities" and the FTC Act is not applica-
ble to private suits. Therefore, private exclusive dealing cases involving services rather than
commodities must be brought under the Sherman Act.
1983]
CORNELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 69:101
ties and has vacillated considerably over the years. 13
Section 3 of the Clayton Act is the central piece of legislation bear-
ing on exclusive dealing. 14 Congress enacted the Clayton Act in reac-
tion to the Supreme Court's 1911 decision in Standard Oil Co. v. United
States, 15 in which the Court announced the "rule of reason," and as a
result of the congressional hearings that followed. 16 It became law in
1914, soon after President Wilson's call for legislation to prohibit the
anticompetitive practices then being employed by the trusts. 17 Criticism
of the tying I8 and exclusive dealing practices of the United Shoe Ma-
chinery Company leveled by Louis D. Brandeis provided the specific
impetus for including section 3 in the Act. 19 Support for this section
also grew in response to the Supreme Court's 1912 decision upholding
the tying practices of the A.B. Dick Company,20 and the Eighth Cir-
13 See Handler, Some Misadventures in Antitrust Policymaking--Nineteenth Annual Review, 76
YALE LJ. 92, 95-96 (1966).
14 Prior to enactment of the Clayton Act in 1914, some courts invalidated exclusive
dealing arrangements under the Sherman Act where the arrangements extended over an un-
reasonable period of time or constituted part of an otherwise unlawful scheme. See United
States Tel. Co. v. Central Union Tel. Co., 202 F. 66 (6th Cir.) (long distance telephone con-
tract with 99 year duration was restrictive with tendencies toward monopoly, and hence vio-
lated Sherman Act), cert. denied, 229 U.S. 620 (1913); United States v. Great Lakes Towing
Co., 208 F. 733 (N.D. Ohio 1913) (unreasonably broad noncompetition agreements violated
Sherman Act), modifted, 217 F. 656 (N.D. Ohio 1914), appeal dismissed, 245 U.S. 675 (1917).
Where, however, an arrangement did not expressly bind the purchaser to deal exclusively
with one seller but did induce him not to carry competing merchandise by offering him price
rebates or discounts as an incentive, courts found neither a contract nor a restraint of trade
within the meaning of the Sherman Act. See Whitwell v. Continental Tobacco Co., 125 F.
454 (8th Cir. 1903); In re Corning, 51 F. 205 (N.D. Ohio 1892); In re Terrell, 51 F. 213
(S.D.N.Y. 1892); In re Greene, 52 F. 104 (S.D. Ohio 1892); accord W.T. Rawleigh Medical Co.
v. Osborne, 177 Iowa 208, 158 N.W. 566 (1916) (restrictive contract clause considered security
for credit arrangements and not restraint of trade).
At common law, courts generally considered exclusive dealing arrangements valid. See
Note, The Legality of Contracts ofSale which Prohibit the Purchaser-Retailerfiom Handling Goods ofthe
Wholesaler's Competitors, 30 HARV. L. REV. 72 (1916).
15 221 U.S. 1, 62 (1911).
16 E. KINTNER, THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAWS AND
RELATED STATUTES 994 (1978).
17 W. LETWIN, LAW AND ECONOMIC POLICY IN AMERICA 271-73 (1965).
18 "Tying" requires a purchaser who desires to buy product A also to buy some quantity
of product B. See United States Steel Corp. v. Fortner Enters., Inc., 429 U.S. 610 (1977)
(indicating other prerequisites to tying claim as well). Exclusive dealing requires a purchaser
who desires to buy product A to refrain from buying any of product A from another supplier.
Where product A consists of a line of merchandise, such as shoes, rather than a totally unitary
product, such as milk, it is sometimes difficult to distinguish between tying (or its variant, full
line forcing) and exclusive dealing. See ABA ANTITRUST SECTION, MONOGRAPH No. 8,
VERTICAL RESTRICTIONS UPON BUYERS LIMITING PURCHASES OF GOODS FROM OTHERS
95-97 (1982); M. PORTER, INTERBRAND CHOICE, STRATEGY, AND BILATERAL MARKET
POWER 63 (1976).
19 E. KINTNER, supra note 16, at 994-95.
20 Henry v. A.B. Dick Co., 224 U.S. 1 (1912). See E. KINTNER, supra note 16, at 995.
The A.B. Dick case was later overruled in Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg.
Co., 243 U.S. 502, 518 (1917).
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cuit's 1903 decision allowing the Continental Tobacco Company to
grant rebates to customers that did not carry competing brands.21
Section 3 emerged as a broad prohibition against tying and exclu-
sive dealing. It became unlawful to lease or sell commodities in inter-
state commerce "on the condition, agreement, or understanding" that
the lessee or purchaser will not deal in commodities of a competitor of
the lessor or seller, where the effect "may be to substantially lessen com-
petition or tend to create a monopoly in any line of commerce.
'22
A. Supreme Court Precedents
The Supreme Court first addressed exclusive dealing in the context
of distribution in 1922, in Standard Fashion Co. v. Magrane Houston Co. 23
The Court invalidated an arrangement under which retailers purchas-
ing sewing patterns from Standard Fashion agreed not to carry patterns
of competing suppliers. This arrangement bound forty percent of the
pattern agencies in the country, and the Court determined that this
amounted to a substantial lessening of competition and tended to create
a monopoly in violation of section 3. Not only did the arrangement
foreclose a high overall percentage of outlets nationwide, but, the Court
assumed, in larger cities it would deny competitors access to the most
desirable shops, while in smaller communities it would exclude them
altogether.
24
21 Whitwell v. Continental Tobacco Co., 125 F. 454 (8th Cir. 1903). See 51 CONG. REc.
9161 (1914) (remarks of Rep. Floyd).
22 15 U.S.C. § 14 (1982). The full section reads:
It shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce, in the course of
such commerce, to lease or make a sale or contract for sale of goods, wares,
merchandise, machinery, supplies, or other commodities, whether patented or
unpatented, for use, consumption, or resale within the United States or any
Territory thereof or the District of Columbia or any insular possession or
other place under the jurisdiction of the United States, or fix a price charged
therefor, or discount from, or rebate upon, such price, on the condition, agree-
ment, or understanding that the lessee or purchaser thereof shall not use or
deal in the goods, wares, merchandise, machinery, supplies, or other commod-
ities of a competitor or competitors of the lessor or seller, where the effect of
such lease, sale, or contract for sale or such condition, agreement, or under-
standing may be to substantially lessen competition or tend to create a mo-
nopoly in any line of commerce.
Committee treatment of the bills that eventually became § 3 is described in Handler, Recent
Antitrust Developments, 71 YALE L.J. 75, 85-86 (1961), and Lockhart & Sacks, supra note 6, at
934-35.
23 258 U.S. 346 (1922). Prior to Standard Fashion, the Federal Trade Commission had
applied a virtual rule of per se illegality to exclusive dealing arrangements under § 3 in a
number of cases. Standard Elec. Mfg. Co., 5 F.T.C. 376 (1923); B.S. Pearsall Butter Co., 5
F.T.C. 127 (1922); Stanley Booking Corp., 1 F.T.C. 212 (1918). See Bok, The Tampa Electric
Case and the Problem ofExclusive Arrangements Under the Clayton Act, 1961 Sup. CT. REv. 267, 273,
327.
24 Critics have argued that the evidence of record did not support all of the Court's
factual assumptions. See Bok, supra note 23, at 321-22.
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Almost twenty years later, in Fashion Orzginators Guild v. FTC, 5 the
Court again emphasized the substantial market share involved. It held
that a concerted effort by a guild of textile and garment manufacturers,
which accounted for over sixty percent of sales in the relevant market, to
prevent their customers from dealing in merchandise copied from guild
members' designs, violated both section 3 of the Clayton Act and the
Federal Trade Commission Act. The Court also found the arrangement
unlawful under sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act.
Exclusive dealing came in for its harshest treatment in two subse-
quent Supreme Court decisions, Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 26 (the
"Standard Stations" case) and FTC v. Brown Shoe Co. 27 The Standard Sta-
tions case ushered in what became known as the rule of "quantitative
substantiality," predicating illegality entirely upon the percentage of
distributors foreclosed. The Court invalidated an exclusive dealing ar-
rangement entered into between a gasoline supplier, having a market
share of twenty-three percent,28 and a group of independent service sta-
tions. The group comprised sixteen percent of the independent service
stations in the relevant market and accounted for 6.7% of gasoline sales.
The Court also considered the fact that the supplier's six major competi-
tors, who accounted for another forty-two percent, all employed similar
arrangements. Observing that "serious difficulties would attend" any
attempt to apply more complex economic tests, 29 the Court held that
"§ 3 is satisfied by proof that competition has been foreclosed in a sub-
stantial share of the line of commerce affected."
'30
The Court went further in 1966 when it decided Brown Shoe31 under
the Federal Trade Commission Act. It held that percentages are of little
or no importance, and that an exclusive dealing arrangement between
the nation's second largest shoe manufacturer and its 650 retail outlets
violated the Act simply because the arrangement foreclosed competing
manufacturers from a "substantial number" of distributors.32 The
25 312 U.S. 457 (1941).
26 337 U.S. 293 (1949).
27 384 U.S. 316 (1966).
28 The 23% share included sales both through the supplier's wholly owned service sta-
tions and through independent stations.
29 337 U.S. at 308; cf. United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 611 (1972)
(courts are "ill-equipped" for economic decision making). But cf Continental T.V., Inc. v.
GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977) (calling for economic analysis); Marco Co., 50 F.T.C.
485, 488 (1953) (FTC was "specifically designed" to make complex economic decisions and
should "exercise [its] talents" even though courts may feel "ill suited" to weigh all relevant
factors).
30 337 U.S. at 314. The Standard Stations opinion is discussed in American Motor Inns,
Inc. v. Holiday Inns, Inc., 521 F.2d 1230, 1251 (3d Cir. 1975), and in M. HANDLER, ANTI-
TRUST IN PERSPECTVE 29-48 (1957).
31 FTC v. Brown Shoe, Inc., 384 U.S. 316 (1966).
32 Brown Shoe Co., 62 F.T.C. 679, 714 (1963), reo'd, 339 F.2d 45 (9th Cir. 1964), ren'd,
384 U.S. 316, 319 (1966).
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Court observed that the Federal Trade Commission had broad powers
to prevent practices "which conflict with the basic policies of the Sher-
man and Clayton Acts even though such practices may not actually vio-
late these laws."' 33 Brown Shoe has not been widely applied, although the
FTC did follow it in a few cases decided in the late 1960s and early
1970s.
3 4
The Supreme Court's decision in Tampa Electric Co. v. Nashville Coal
Co., 35 decided under the Clayton Act five years before Brown Shoe, has
been more influential. In Tampa Electric, the Court rejected the quanti-
tative substantiality test and announced what has become known as the
rule of "qualitative substantiality." This rule places less emphasis on
raw market share data and gives more weight to "the probable effect of
the contract on the relevant area of effective competition. ' 36 Tampa
Electric involved an end-user rather than a distributor, but the standard
the Court formulated constitutes an important part of the test applica-
ble to distributors. The exclusive dealing arrangement at issue was an
electric utility's twenty-year requirements contract, which bound it to
purchase all of its coal requirements from one supplier. The contract
covered $128 million worth of coal, but foreclosed only 0.77% of the
relevant market to other coal suppliers.
The Court held that exclusive dealing is not illegal unless "the com-
petition foreclosed by the contract [is] found to constitute a substantial
share of the relevant market. That is to say, the opportunities for other
traders to enter into or remain in that market must be significantly lim-
ited. . .. -37 The Court went on to explain that
[t]o determine substantiality in a given case, it is necessary to weigh
the probable effect of the contract on the relevant area of effective
competition, taking into account the relative strength of the parties,
the proportionate volume of commerce involved in relation to the to-
tal volume of commerce in the relevant market area, and the probable
immediate and future effects which pre-emption of that share of the
market might have on effective competition therein. It follows that a
mere showing that the contract itself involves a substantial number of
33 384 U.S. at 321. The Court remarked that Brown Shoe's program "obviously con-
flicts with the central policy of both § 1 of the Sherman Act and § 3 of the Clayton Act
against contracts which take away freedom of purchasers to buy in an open market." Id The
Court added, however, that it was not necessary to prove that the effect of the program might
be "to substantially lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly" because the FTC Act
can reach "restraints in their incipiency without proof that they amount to an outright viola-
tion of§3. ... Id at 321-22.
34 Adolph Coors Co., 83 F.T.C. 32, ajfd, 497 F.2d 1178 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S.
1105 (1974); L.G. Balfour Co. v. FTC, 442 F.2d 1 (7th Cir. 1971); Luria Bros. & Co. v. FTC,
389 F.2d 847 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 829 (1968).
35 365 U.S. 320 (1961). Tampa Electric is analyzed at length in Bok, supra note 23.
36 365 U.S. at 329.
37 Id at 328.
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dollars is ordinarily of little consequence. 38
The lower courts have applied this standard in a number of subsequent
cases, largely displacing the Standard Stations approach.39
B. Beltone
The most significant recent decision on exclusive dealing in the
context of distribution is the Federal Trade Commission's opinion in
Beltone Electronics Corp. 40 The Commission upheld the legality of exclu-
sive dealing and territorial restrictions that Beltone, a manufacturer of
hearing aids, imposed on seven to eight percent of the retail dealers in
the country. The restrictions affected approximately sixteen percent of
total hearing aid sales.
The Beltone decision signals a departure from the former practice of
applying the Federal Trade Commission Act as expansively as possible,
as in Brown Shoe, and adheres rather strictly to Clayton Act standards.
4 '
In effect, Beltone represents the coalescence of Tampa Electric's "qualita-
tive substantiality" standard, Sylvania's framework for analyzing vertical
restraints, 42 and "Chicago School" economics.
43
38 Id at 329. The Court also noted that if an exclusive dealing arrangement "does not
fall within the broader proscription of § 3 of the Clayton Act" it is not forbidden by §§ 1 or 2
of the Sherman Act. Id at 335.
39 See Pitchford v. PEPI, Inc., 531 F.2d 92, 99-100 (3d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 426 U.S.
935 (1976); Smith v. Scrivner-Boogaart, Inc., 447 F.2d 1014, 1017 (10th Cir. 1971), cert. denied,
404 U.S. 1059 (1972); Cornwell Quality Tools v. C.T.S. Co., 446 F.2d 825 (9th Cir. 1971),cert.
denied, 404 U.S. 1049 (1972); Joyce Beverages v. Royal Crown Cola Co., 555 F. Supp. 271
(S.D.N.Y. 1983); Refrigeration Eng'g Corp. v. Frick Co., 370 F. Supp. 702, 708-09 (W.D. Tex.
1974); Curly's Dairy, Inc. v. Dairy Coop. Ass'n, 202 F. Supp. 481, 484-85 (D. Ore. 1962). See
also Twin City Sportservice, Inc. v. Charles 0. Finley & Co., 676 F.2d 1291 (9th Cir.) (consid-
ering aggregate pattern of conduct in relevant market), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 364 (1982);
American Motor Inns, Inc. v. Holiday Inns, Inc., 521 F.2d 1230 (3d Cir. 1975) (discussing
economic justifications for exclusive dealing clause); Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. FTC, 299
F.2d 839, 842 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 816 (1962); Borman, Inc. v. Great Scott Super
Markets, Inc., 1975-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 1 60,321 (E.D. Mich. 1975) (considering effects of
exclusive dealing arrangements on other distributors); Precision Dynamics Corp. v. American
Hosp. Supply Corp., 241 F. Supp. 436, 440, 447 (S.D. Cal. 1965); ABA ANTITRUST SECTION,
supra note 18, at 86 n.430 (1982) (citing cases using Tampa Electric standard).
40 [1979-1983 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 21,934 (F.T.C. 1982).
41 Beltone is especially significant because it was a unanimous decision. The opinion was
written by Commissioner Clanton and joined in by both Chairman Miller and Commissioner
Pertschuk, who failed to agree in two other important distribution cases decided at almost the
same time: General Motors Corp., [1979-1983 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. (CCH)
21,931 (F.T.C. 1982) and Russell Stover, Inc., [1979-1983 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP.
(CCH) 1 21,933 (F.T.C. 1982), rev'd, 1983-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 65,640 (8th Cir. 1983).
Commissioner Bailey filed a separate concurring statement, which is described below.
42 See supra note 9.
43 The Commission relied in particular on R. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX 288
(1978) and Posner, The Next Step in the Antitrust Treatment of Restrictive Distribution; Per Se Legal-
i), 48 U. CHI. L. REv. 1 (1981). The Commission also discussed the analysis contained in
Williamson, Assessing Vertical Market Restraints.- Antitrust Ramifications of the Transactions Cost Ap-
proach, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 953 (1979).
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The Commission made three significant holdings in Be/tone. First,
the Commission held that the degree to which competitors, including
new entrants, are foreclosed is only one element to be considered in as-
sessing the reasonableness of an exclusive dealing arrangement. The
trier of fact must also consider any "reasonable justifications" that exist
for the restraint, as well as the "duration" of the agreement. This goes
beyond the Tampa Electric formulation and incorporates the types of
considerations that played a prominent role in Sylvania. Second, the
Commission held that the availability of less restrictive alternatives is
not determinative; it would be error to prohibit a supplier from impos-
ing an exclusive dealing arrangement merely on the ground that this
would not be the least restrictive means for achieving the supplier's mar-
keting goals. 44 Third, the Commission held that in order to carry the
burden of proving that an exclusive dealing agreement or other vertical
restraint is unreasonable, it is necessary to prove not only a loss of in-
trabrand competition, but also a "probable adverse effect on interbrand
competition. '45 This holding applies more directly to territorial re-
straints than to exclusive dealing, because exclusive dealing alone never
diminishes intrabrand competition. Nonetheless, the language is signifi-
cant for purposes of exclusive dealing because it appears to reject Brown
Shoe and the entire notion that under the FTC Act a violation can be
shown without proving a truly "probable" effect upon interbrand
competition.
Be/tone's analysis of exclusive dealing begins with a review of the
prior authorities. The Commission noted that "since the earliest cases"
the emphasis has been on market foreclosure, but added that more re-
cently courts have begun to employ a "fuller rule-of-reason analysis,
which takes into account not only the market share of the firm but the
dynamic nature of the market in which the foreclosure occurs."146 This
apparently was intended to refer to Tampa Electric and its progeny.
The Commission then described all of the major exclusive dealing
cases decided by the Supreme Court, the lower courts, and the Commis-
44 The Commission's conclusion is based on the Third Circuit's opinion in American
Motor Inns, Inc. v. Holiday Inns, Inc., 521 F.2d 1230, 1248-49 (3d Cir. 1975), and is consis-
tent with a number of other recent decisions that have limited the least restrictive alternative
requirement to per se cases. See, e.g., Kentucky Fried Chicken Corp. v. Diversified Packaging
Corp., 549 F.2d 368, 381 (5th Cir. 1977). Courts, however, have sometimes considered less
restrictive alternatives as bearing upon reasonableness in the context of a rule of reason in-
quiry, at least where some anticompetitive effect has been shown. See Berkey Photo, Inc. v.
Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263, 303 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1093 (1980);
Smith v. Pro Football, Inc., 593 F.2d 1173, 1187-88 (D.C. Cir. 1978); Foster v. Maryland
State Say. & Loan Ass'n, 590 F.2d 928, 933-35 (D.C. Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1071
(1979); Hennessey v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 564 F.2d 1136, 1153 (5th Cir. 1977).
45 [1979-1983 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) at 22,393; accord Mendelovitz
v. Adolph Coors Co., 1982-83 Trade Cas. (CCH) 1 65,090 (5th Cir. 1982); Valley Liquors,
Inc. v. Renfield Importers, Ltd., 678 F.2d 742, 745 (7th Cir. 1982).
46 [1979-1983 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) at 22,387.
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sion, pointing out that the degree of foreclosure in these cases has been
as little as one percent, as in Brown Shoe. The Commission appeared
critical of Brown Shoe, remarking that the decision seemed a "departure
from the Tampa Electric Section 3 test," and had to be considered "am-
biguous" because the Commission was influenced at that time by a
trend toward vertical integration in the shoe industry and by a contem-
poraneous Supreme Court condemnation of a Brown Shoe merger.4 7
In Beltone the Commission also criticized of another pertinent FTC
authority, Adolph Coors Co. 48 It stated that in Coors "the Commission
dispensed with finding the percentage of outlets foreclosed," and that
the court of appeals affirmed, citing "only" Brown Shoe. 49 The Commis-
sion also remarked that Coors and two other Commission cases decided
at about the same time5° added "[1]ittle further precision . . . to the
concept of 'substantial foreclosure.' ",51 This is highly significant, be-
cause, as noted above,52 Brown Shoe and Coors had come to stand for the
proposition that under section 5 of the FTC Act an exclusive dealing
violation could be found if a significant number of outlets were fore-
closed, without any showing of the extent of actual foreclosure in the
relevant market as a whole.
5 3
On the basis of its historical survey, the Commission rejected fore-
closure as the only pertinent criterion. It stated that the foreclosure
standards "are not well settled," and that even if they were, under the
newer Sylvania standard foreclosure must be considered as "only one of
several variables to be weighed."'54 The Commission noted that under
Sylvania there must be close examination of the "dynamics" of the mar-
ket: "More specifically, a proper analysis of exclusive dealing arrange-
ments should take into account market definition, the amount of
foreclosure in the relevant markets, the duration of the contracts, the
extent to which entry is deterred, and the reasonable justifications, if
any, for the exclusivity."-55
Applying these criteria to the facts of Beltone, the Commission
found that despite Beltone's having bound seven to eight percent of the
dealers, who accounted for sixteen percent of the sales, the exclusive
dealing restraints were reasonable because they fostered Beltone's ability
to compete with other brands in the market. The Commission was im-
47 Id at 22,390; see Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294 (1962).
48 83 F.T.C. 32, aj'd, 497 F.2d 1178 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1105 (1974).
49 [1979-1983 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) at 22,390.
50 See L.G. Balfour Co. v. FTC, 442 F.2d 1 (7th Cir. 1971); Luria Bros. & Co. v. FTC,
389 F.2d 847 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 829 (1968).
51 [1979-1983 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) at 22,390.
52 See supra notes 48-50 and accompanying text.
53 See, e.g., Handler, supra note 13, at 97-98.
54 [1979-1983 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) at 22,394.
55 Id at 22,391.
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pressed with both Beltone's interest in stimulating the marketing efforts
of its dealers and Beltone's interest in assuring the effectiveness of its
own marketing efforts.
Beltone had devoted considerable resources to identifying potential
customers for its distributors and was instrumental in generating de-
mand through national and local advertising, but it wanted assurance
that its distributors would meet this demand with Beltone products.
The Commission indicated that the supplier's interest in protecting
these investments provided a legitimate reason for imposing exclusive
dealing. The Commission stated that the exclusive dealing arrangement
had a "rational and efficient connection" to the supplier's objective of
"protect[ing] its investment" in national and local promotional
activity.
5 6
In concluding that the arrangement was lawful, the Commission
also relied on the fact that Beltone's market share was falling, that the
restraints were terminable upon thirty days' notice, and that new en-
trants had experienced little difficulty in finding other distributors.5 7
Commissioner Bailey filed a separate statement criticizing the
Commission for even bothering to scrutinize the justifications Beltone
proffered for its restraints. According to Commissioner Bailey, once the
Commission found "an essentially competitive interbrand market ...
not adversely affected by Beltone's system of intrabrand restraints," its
analysis should have ended.58 In Commissioner Bailey's view, "addi-
tional analysis of Beltone's 'justifications' for its system of intrabrand
restraints was unnecessary. ' '59
Beltone constitutes a significant step in assembling a framework for
analysis of exclusive dealing. In itself, the decision might not be consid-
ered a breakthrough, because the same framework could be strung to-
gether from other cases, including Tampa Electric and Sylvania. What is
significant, however, is that this analysis came out of the Federal Trade
Commission, against the largely antithetical background of Brown Shoe
and Coors, which, but for Be/tone, would remain the leading authorities
under the FTC Act.
56 Id at 22,398. This theme is echoed in a recent article, discussed infra in the text
accompanying note 120, which argues that the real procompetitive effect of exclusive dealing
is not that it encourages dealers to increase their marketing efforts, but that it permits the
supplier to provide greater support to its dealers, safe in the knowledge that those dealers will
not be using this support to sell someone else's competing products. See Marvel, Exclusive
Dealing, 25 J.L. & EcON. 1 (1982).
57 The Commission noted, but did not place special emphasis on, the fact that none of
the other suppliers in the industry employed exclusive dealing arrangements. Interestingly,
such arrangements had been outlawed a number of times by previous FTC consent decrees.
[1979-1983 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) at 22,395.
58 Id at 22,401.
59 Id
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ANALYZING THE EFFECTS OF EXCLUSIVE DEALING
To delineate the standard that should be applied to exclusive deal-
ing, or even to characterize the standard, is no simple matter. In enact-
ing section 3 of the Clayton Act, Congress intended to supersede the rule
of reason that the Court had announced a few years earlier 60 and to
replace it with a new standard, interdicting practices "which may...
substantially lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly." It is not
clear, however, how the two standards differed.
6'
In tying cases, the Supreme Court shaped the section 3 standard
into a per se rule of illegality, on the theory that tying contracts "serve
hardly any purpose beyond the suppression of competition.1 62 In exclu-
sive dealing cases, however, the Court recognized that certain exclusive
arrangements "may well be of economic advantage" to buyers, sellers
and the consuming public alike,63 and it developed the standard of
"qualitative substantiality. '64 This standard is being interpreted today
as indistinguishable from the rule of reason, at least partly in response to
Sylvania's indication that the rule of reason should apply generally to
nonprice vertical restraints. 65 In Beltone, for example, the Commission
explicitly professed to be undertaking a "rule of reason" inquiry into the
legality of the exclusive dealing provisions.66 Likewise, in a recent ami-
cus curiae brief filed with the Supreme Court, the Department of Justice
took the position that courts are to assess exclusive dealing arrangements
under the rule of reason.
67
60 See Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911).
61 See M. HANDLER, supra note 30, at 31 ("[P]recisely how this new test differed, if at all,
from the [rule of reason], neither its words nor history disclose."); E. KINTNER, supra note 16,
at 997-1000; Handler, Recent Antitrust Developments, 71 YALE L.J. 75, 84-87 (1961); Lockhart &
Sacks, supra note 6, at 938; Note, supra note 14, at 74.
62 Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293, 305-06 (1949); accord Northern P.
Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958).
63 337 U.S. at 306.
64 See supra notes 35-39 and accompanying text.
65 Sylvania, 433 U.S. at 59. Note that Sylvania arguably did not disturb the per se rule
against tying because it relied on Northern P. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1 (1958), which
applies this rule.
66 The Commission observed that in the more recent exclusive dealing cases, "the courts
have employed a fuller rule-of-reason analysis . . . ." Beltone, [1979-1983 Transfer Binder]
TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) at 22,387. Later the Commission described Sylvania as "returning to
a rule of reason analysis for non-price vertical restraints . . id at 22,391, and proceeded to
balance the procompetitive and anticompetitive effects of Beltone's exclusive dealing arrange-
ment. See also White & White Inc. v. American Hosp. Supply Corp., 540 F. Supp. 951, 1027
(W.D. Mich. 1982).
67 Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 7, Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2
v. Hyde, No. 82-1031 (U.S., filed May 14, 1983) (supporting Petition for Certiorari). The
government argued that a hospital's exclusive contract for anesthesia services should have
been treated as an exclusive dealing arrangement and assessed under the rule of reason,
rather than being treated as a per se illegal tying arrangement. Hyde v. Jefferson Parish
Hosp. Dist. No. 2, 686 F.2d 286 (5th Cir. 1982).
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In any event, whether the inquiry mandated by the Supreme Court
is properly labeled a "rule of reason" inquiry or something else, it is
apparent that because exclusive dealing arrangements have been recog-
nized as serving legitimate purposes, courts must balance their procom-
petitive and anticompetitive effects. Regardless of the terminology
applied to this balancing, an analysis of the type undertaken in Beltone is
imperative, both to satisfy the qualitative substantiality standard of
Tampa Electic, and to perform the economic evaluation required by
Sylvania.
This does not mean, however, that the Beltone approach cannot be
improved. The Commission in Be/tone was too quick to combine its ex-
amination of exclusive dealing with its economic appraisal of the territo-
rial restraints that were also at issue. After separately describing the
leading precedents on territorial restraints and exclusive dealing, the
Commission launched into a unitary assessment headed "Analysis of
Competitive Effects" and subheaded "Exclusive Dealing and Territorial
Restraints."68
The two should not be combined so readily. Although the Com-
mission may have reached the proper result, its analysis leaves the
impression that the appropriate avenues of inquiry for territorial restric-
tions and exclusive dealing are essentially the same. For example, at one
point the Commission erroneously remarked: "All vertical restraints, of
course, by their very nature occasion some reduction in intrabrand com-
petition .... -69 Exclusive dealing, as explained earlier, does not have
this effect by itself. At another point the Commission reviewed the eco-
nomic literature on vertical restraints, but failed to draw any distinction
between the economic effects of resale restraints and the economic ef-
fects of exclusive dealing.70 Other cases decided since Sylvania have suf-
fered from the same failure to differentiate.
7 1
68 See Beltone, [1979-1983 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) at 22,391, 22,394.
69 Id at 22,397.
70 Id at 22,392-94.
71 See, e.g., Twin City Sportservice, Inc. v. Charles 0. Finley & Co., 676 F.2d 1291 (9th
Cir.) (exclusive concession franchise contract for events at major baseball stadium), cert. de-
nied, 103 S. Ct. 364 (1982); Gilbuilt Homes, Inc. v. Continental Homes, 667 F.2d 209 (1st Cir.
1981) (termination of dealership); Barnosky Oils, Inc. v. Union Oil Co., 665 F.2d 74 (6th Cir.
1981) (horizontal customer and territorial allocations and exclusive dealing arrangements);
Bob Maxfield, Inc. v. American Motors Corp., 637 F.2d 1033 (5th Cir.) (termination of
franchise dealership), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 860 (1981); Perington Wholesale, Inc. v. Burger
King Corp., 631 F.2d 1369 (10th Cir. 1979) (exclusive dealing contract and tying arrange-
ment), on remand, 554 F. Supp. 708 (D.C. Colo. 1982); Dillon Materials Handling, Inc. v.
Albion Indus., 567 F.2d 1299 (5th Cir.) (former exclusive stocking distributor sued manufac-
turer), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 832 (1978); Brown v. Hansen Publications, Inc., 556 F.2d 969 (9th
Cir. 1977) (exclusive concession contract for sheet music and music books); White & White,
Inc. v. American Hosp. Supply Corp., 540 F. Supp. 951, 1026-32 (W.D. Mich. 1982) (dictum)
(exclusive dealing and group boycott in medical surgical supplies business); Sapienza v. New
York News, Inc., 481 F. Supp. 671 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (territorial restraints in home delivery of
newspapers); Optivision, Inc. v. Syracuse Shopping Center Assoc., 472 F. Supp. 665
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Although certain similarities exist among the various vertical re-
straints, it is misleading to suggest that all vertical restraints have the
same procompetitive and anticompetitive effects, and that all may be
justified under a single economic equation. A proper analysis of exclu-
sive dealing must use a different approach from that used in analyzing
territorial and other resale restraints, because exclusive dealing creates
significantly different procompetitive and anticompetitive effects.
7 2
Sylvaniza illustrates the analysis of resale restraints. The Court there
weighed the limitation of intrabrand competition arising from one type
of territorial limitation-a location clause-against the promotion of in-
terbrand competition stimulated by the resulting elimination of the
"free rider" effect. By restricting each dealer to reselling only from a
specified location, the supplier in Sylvania prevented any individual
dealer from taking a free ride on the marketing efforts of dealers in other
locations. This encouraged each dealer to compete against other brands
in its own area, rather than against dealers of the same brand in other
areas. The territorial restriction at issue in Beltone had essentially the
same effects.
The effects on competition in exclusive dealing, however, are decid-
edly different, and the analysis should reflect these differences. Exclu-
sive dealing promotes interbrand competition by encouraging intensive
market penetration and "demand-generating activities. ' 73 On the sur-
face these appear to be the same effects as those of the location clause in
(N.D.N.Y. 1979) (exclusivity clause in lease of space in shopping center challenged by
competitor).
72 Normally, there can be no liability for asking that a distributor enter into an exclusive
dealing arrangement-there must be an actual agreement. Courts have refused to find ille-
gality where a supplier merely sought to persuade a distributor to handle its brand exclu-
sively, or unilaterally terminated a distributor for failure to do so. See Ron Tonkin Gran
Turismo, Inc. v. Fiat Distribs., Inc., 637 F.2d 1376, 1388-89 (9th Cir.) (mere offer to enter into
exclusive dealing arrangement not violative of Clayton Act), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 831 (1981);
Dillon Materials Handling, Inc. v. Albion Indus., 567 F.2d 1299, 1306 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
439 U.S. 832 (1978); Amplex of Md., Inc. v. Outboard Marine Corp., 380 F.2d 112, 115 (4th
Cir. 1967) (unilateral refusal to sell not actionable), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 1036 (1968); Timken
Roller Bearing Co. v. FTC, 299 F.2d 839, 842 (6th Cir.) (manufacturer may lawfully termi-
nate jobbers who deal in competitive products), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 861 (1962); McElhenny
Co. v. Western Auto Supply Co., 269 F.2d 332, 337-39 (4th Cir. 1959) (carrying out threat to
discontinue selling products to retailer who handled goods of competitor not unlawful); Elliot
& Frantz, Inc. v. Raygo, Inc., 379 F. Supp. 498, 501-02 (E.D. Pa. 1974) (mere refusal by
manufacturer to deal with retailer who should not enter into exlcusive dealing arrangement
not unlawful); Carbon Steel Prods. Corp. v. Alan Wood Steel Co., 289 F. Supp. 584, 588
(S.D.N.Y. 1968) (refusal to deal with distributor who handles competitive products does not
violate antitrust laws); Alpha Distrib. Co. v. Jack Daniel's Distillery, 207 F. Supp. 136, 138
(N.D. Cal. 1961) (manufacturer has right to free selection of distributors and may refuse to
deal with one who handles closely competitive products), aftdper euriam, 304 F.2d 451 (9th
Cir. 1962).
73 This language is from the Beltone description of economic justifications for vertical
restraints. Beltone, [1979-1983 Transfer Binder] TRADE REc. REP. (CCH) at 22,392.
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Sylvania, the territorial restraint in Beltone, or any resale restraint. The
mechanics, however, are wholly distinct.
With territorial and other resale restraints, the free rider effect that
the restraint eliminates may be defined more precisely as an "intrabrand
free rider effect"; dealers compete more vigorously against other brands
because they need not worry that other dealers of the same brand will
capitalize upon their efforts by "skimming the cream" of their custom-
ers. Exclusive dealing promotes interbrand competition in two ways.
First, it encourages distributors to promote the brand more vigorously
simply because they have no other brands to sell. Second, it encourages
the supplier itself to give the distributors more support by eliminating
what may be called the "interbrand free rider effect"; suppliers will
strengthen their distributors because other brands cannot take a "free
ride" on the supplier's investment by selling through the same distribu-
tors.74 Thus, although exclusive dealing promotes interbrand competi-
tion, the forces generating this effect are discrete from those at work in
the case of territorial and other resale restraints.
It is also important to bear in mind that unlike resale restraints,
exclusive dealing in no way limits intrabrand competition. Exclusive
dealing is a restraint on purchasing rather than on selling. Because it
does not limit intrabrand competition, exclusive dealing also does noth-
ing to limit the intrabrand free rider effect. Distributors of one brand of a
product all may be bound by exclusive dealing arrangements, but this
will not prevent them from* poaching on the marketing efforts of their
brethren, unless they are also bound by other restraints. Therefore, the
elimination of the intrabrand free rider effect is not one of the procompeti-
tive effects of an exclusive dealing arrangement. Nevertheless, exclusive
dealing still can be expected to have the procompetitive effects of focus-
ing the efforts of each distributor on one brand, and of eliminating the
interbrand free rider effect by preventing other brands from syphoning off
part of each distributor's efforts.
One other critical distinction should be made in analyzing exclu-
sive dealing. Unlike resale restraints, which restrict intrabrand competi-
tion but ordinarily promote interbrand competition, 75 exclusive dealing
74 See Marvel, supra note 56, at 6-11; Bok, supra note 23, at 310.
That the free rider effect has several dimensions beyond the intrabrand free rider effect
presented in Sylvania is illustrated by USM Corp. v. SPS Technologies, Inc., 1982-83 Trade
Cas. (CCH) 65,077, at 71,032 (7th Cir. 1982) (free riding threatened against licensor), and
United States Trotting Ass'n v. Chicago Downs Ass'n, Inc., 665 F.2d 781, 789 (7th Cir. 1981)
(free riding among group of horizontal competitors).
The "interbrand free rider effect" does not apply to the efforts of the distributors-as
distinguished from the investments of suppliers-because competing suppliers cannot be said
to be taking a "free ride" on the investments of the distributors who are, after all, in the
business of distributing and who may want to carry as many brands as possible.
75 Whether this is true of one resale restraint, resale price maintenance, has been the
subject of heated debate. Compare, e.g., Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S.
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both inhibits and promotes interbrand competition at the same time.
The inhibition is the foreclosure effect, described earlier, which was once
virtually the entire focus of exclusive dealing analysis.7 6 Thus, unlike
the inquiry that territorial and customer restraints require, in which the
factfinder must balance intrabrand and interbrand effects, the analysis
for exclusive dealing requires balancing the reduction of interbrand
competition resulting from the foreclosure effect against the stimulation
of that same interbrand competition.
Striking that balance, however, is not easy. "Foreclosure" is not
nearly as simple a concept in the context of distribution as it is where
end-users are the buyers, or as it might appear from earlier cases which
merely relied on percentages. Encouragement of interbrand competi-
tion is likewise difficult to measure properly in the context of exclusive
dealing, and is far more complex than the cases suggest. The proper
considerations for assessing both the anticompetitive effects and the
procompetitive effects of exclusive dealing in the context of distribution
are in need of substantial refinement. Specific recommendations are of-
fered below.
A. The Anticompetitive Effect-Foreclosure
Beltone held that the degree of market foreclosure is only one consid-
eration in judging the legality of an exclusive dealing arrangement.
Nonetheless, foreclosure of competitors continues to be a principal factor
for judicial inquiry77 because it remains the primary anticompetitive ef-
fect of exclusive dealing. Measuring foreclosure, however, is not yet an
exact science. Although courts in the past concentrated on finding the
percentage of available distributors who have been foreclosed or the per-
centage of total sales those distributors accounted for, both Tampa Elec-
tric and Beltone instruct that these measures alone are no longer an
adequate measure of foreclosure. Market "dynamics" must also be con-
sidered. The cases provide little guidance, however, as to what these
"dynamics" are or how they are to be determined.
When an exclusive dealing arrangement involves an end-user, the
36, 51 n. 18 (1977) and Gerhart, The "Competitive Advantages " Explanation for Intrabrand Restraints:
An Antitrust Analysis, 1981 DUKE LJ. 417 with Posner, supra note 43, at 15-17; see aro Brief of
the Department of Justice as Amicus Curiae, Spray-Rite Serv. Corp. v. Monsanto Co., No.
82-914 (U.S., filed Jan. 3, 1983) (supporting Petition for Certiorari). See generally ABA ANTI-
TRUST SECTION, MONOGRAPH No. 2, VERTICAL RESTRICTIONS LIMITING INTRABRAND
COMPETITION 78-84 (1977). In the case of nonprice resale restraints such as territorial and
customer restrictions, most courts have accepted this proposition. See, e.g., Sports Center, Inc.
v. Riddell, Inc., 673 F.2d 786, 791 (5th Cir. 1982) ("Unless decidedly unreasonable, vertical
restrictions upon product distribution are permissible and even desirable.").
76 See supra notes 46-47 and accompanying text.
77 It also seems clear that a very low percentage of foreclosure will continue to provide
something of a "safe harbor" under Tampa Electric, regardless of any other features of a partic-
ular exclusive dealing arrangement.
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foreclosure effect is straightforward; sales to the end-user are foreclosed.
In Tampa Electric, for example, sales to the utility were foreclosed to any
other suppliers of coal. When distributors are involved, however, this
kind of one-to-one analysis is not reliable. Although courts have concen-
trated on finding the percentage of available distributors foreclosed or
the percentage of total sales accounted for, the most meaningful way to
determine the foreclosure effect is to examine the extent to which com-
peting suppliers actually have been foreclosed from reaching the ulti-
mate "market," the consumers of their product. 78
Percentages provide a starting point for measuring foreclosure, but
the practical effect of binding a certain percentage of distributors to ex-
clusive dealing contracts depends on a number of factors. Merely to
find that one supplier has signed twenty-five percent of the existing dis-
tributors of a product to exclusive dealing contracts, or has signed dis-
tributors who historically have accounted for twenty-five percent of
total sales, does not indicate enough about foreclosure to provide the
basis for a sound judgment as to the legality of the arrangement. The
arrangement may foreclose other suppliers from reaching twenty-five
percent of the potential consumers of the product, fifty percent of them,
or none of them at all. This would be the case even if other suppliers in
the same industry have foreclosed another twenty-five percent of the ex-
isting distributors with exclusive dealing contracts of their own. 79 More-
over, evidence that an exclusive dealing arrangement has bound twenty-
five percent of the number of distributors in an area means even less than
evidence that the arrangement has bound distributors who historically
have accounted for twenty-five percent of total sales. Twenty-five per-
cent of the number of distributors may have accounted for ten percent of
total sales or ninety percent of total sales during a prior period, and the
percentage of total sales they will account for in the future is even less
clear.
A meaningful analysis of the impact of exclusive dealing must rec-
ognize that the true foreclosure effect of binding any particular percent-
age of distributors to exclusive dealing contracts can vary dramatically,
depending upon a number of important variables: (1) Are the distribu-
tors wholesalers or retailers? (2) Is the product a "shopping" product or
78 See Turner, The Validity of Tying Arrangements Under the Antitrust Laws, 72 HARV. L.
REV. 50, 72 (1958) ("Distributors are merely channels to the ultimate market."); see a/so Stan-
dard Oil Co. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293, 323 (1949) (Jackson, J., dissenting) ("[Tihe
retailer. . . is only a conduit . . . to get the business of the ultimate consumer . . ").
79 In the Standard Stations case the Supreme Court placed considerable emphasis upon
the fact that exclusive dealing arrangements were prevalent in the oil industry. It invalidated
an exclusive dealing arrangement entered into by a supplier, having a market share of 23%,
with 16% of the independent service stations in the area (accounting for 6.7% of gasoline
sales), where the supplier's six major competitors, accounting for another 42%, all employed
similar arrangements. 337 U.S. at 295. In Beltone, the respondent was the only supplier in the
entire industry that was imposing exclusive dealing restrictions.
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a "convenience" product-durable or perishable, expensive or inexpen-
sive? (3) Are alternative methods of distribution available to suppliers?
(4) Can other suppliers establish new distributors of their own? Any
analysis of exclusive dealing should factor-in each of these variables.
Each variable will be considered below.
1. Level of Distribution
The level of distribution at which exclusive dealing is imposed can
have an enormous effect upon the degree of foreclosure. Although an
exclusive dealing arrangement binding twenty-five percent of the end-
users in a market plainly forecloses twenty-five percent of the "market,"
with retailers and wholesalers the relationship is seldom one-to-one.
They do not consume, and they may or may not have much influence
over those who do.
Betone, like Brown Shoe and Standard Stations, dealt with an arrange-
ment imposed upon retailers. 80 Few cases have dealt with exclusive
dealing restrictions placed upon wholesale distributors or other such in-
termediaries. Yet wholesalers can differ as significantly from retailers as
retailers do from end-users. Foreclosure of wholesalers normally will
have less of an effect on competing suppliers than foreclosure of either
end-users or retailers.
a. Retailers. Measuring foreclosure when an exclusive dealing ar-
rangement is imposed upon a retailer requires an examination of con-
sumer loyalty. An exclusive dealing arrangement with a retailer may
foreclose other brands from almost all of that retailer's customers or
from almost none of them, depending upon how loyal the customers are
to the retailer. Certain types of outlets, because of their location, serv-
ices, or personnel, can command more loyalty than the brands they sell,
and foreclosure of those types of retailers may genuinely foreclose that
part of the ultimate market. A neighborhood tavern, for example, may
begin selling only one brand of draft beer, or may switch from one ex-
clusive brand to another without a significant loss of patronage. 8' Simi-
larly, a neighborhood shoe store may switch exclusive brands of shoes
without losing many customers, 2 or a neighborhood service station may
80 The dealers in Be/tone should be considered retailers because they sold directly to
consumers. The supplier shipped directly to these dealers without using intermediary
wholesalers.
81 Compare Adolph Coors Co. v. FTC, 497 F.2d 1178 (10th Cir. 1974) (where Coors'
control over its distributors was held to violate Sherman Act because it forced distributors to
control retailers), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1105 (1975) with Dawson, Unconscionable Coercion: The
German Version, 89 HARV. L. Rev. 1041, 1088-96 (1976) (analysis of "shackling" of beer retail-
ers in Germany).
82 Cf Brown Shoe Co., 62 F.T.C. 679 (1963) (agreements with independent retailers to




switch exclusive brands of spark plugs without loss. 8 3 In these cases, an
exclusive dealing arrangement with retailers accounting for twenty-five
percent of each product's sales may well foreclose roughly twenty-five
percent of total sales in the market, because these retailers can be ex-
pected to "deliver" their following of customers.
8 4
The most extreme example of foreclosure at the retail level is the
retail monopolist. For example, if a dress pattern company were to
enter into an exclusive dealing arrangement with the only general store
in a small, isolated town, the store might be able to deliver every poten-
tial dress pattern customer in the area. This was a real concern in Stan-
dard Fashion. Today it is less common, although in the case of certain
specialized retailers local retail monopolies can still exist. If a town has
only one commercial bank, for example, a check printing company that
enters into an exclusive dealing contract with that bank could foreclose
other suppliers from the town's entire demand for checks. If a neighbor-
hood has only one shoe repair shop, a replacement heel manufacturer
that enters into an exclusive dealing contract with that shop similarly
could foreclose all other suppliers from area residents.
85
Not every retailer, however, has captive or even particularly loyal
patrons. A department store may lose sales if it switches from one exclu-
sive brand of shoes or spark plugs to another, because customers may
delay purchasing these items until they find their favorite brand at an-
other outlet. Customers of a neighborhood shoe store or service station,
in contrast, are more likely to rely on their local merchant's choice of
merchandise. Many department stores command relatively little loyalty
because their customers frequent numerous other retailers that offer es-
sentially the same types of goods. The hypothetical department store
may sell more shoes or spark plugs of the one brand it does carry than it
would if it carried several brands because some of its customers will be
indifferent to brand names or will be sufficiently loyal to the store to
trust the store's judgment in selecting superior merchandise. The de-
83 Cf Atlantic Ref. Co. v. FTC, 381 U.S. 357 (1965) (agreement between Atlantic and
Goodyear whereby Atlantic pressured its retailers to stock only Goodyear products held ille-
gal); Champion Spark Plugs, 50 F.T.C. 30 (1953) (agreements with distributors to deal solely
with Champion Spark Plugs held illegal).
84 Professor Porter distinguishes between "convenience outlets" and "non-convenience"
outlets. M. PORTER, supra note 18, at 23. Convenience outlets are defined as outlets that
provide little or no sales assistance and that are densely spaced. Nonconvenience outlets are
defined as outlets that provide sales assistance and that are widely spaced, such as automobile
dealerships.
85 See generaly D. BOWERsOx, M. COOPER, D. LAMBERT & D. TAYLOR, MANAGEMENT
IN MARKETING CHANNELS 272-73 (1980) [hereinafter cited as MANAGEMENT].
Of course, a local monopolist may have sufficient economic power to resist efforts by
suppliers to require exclusive dealing. Cf. United States v. Griffith, 334 U.S. 100 (1948) (use
of monopoly power in one market to gain power in second market held illegal); United States
v. Crescent Amusement Co., 323 U.S. 173 (1944) (arrangement between distributors and ex-
hibitors to control showing of motion pictures held illegal).
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partment store, however, probably will not be in a position to deliver all
of its potential shoe or spark plug customers to the one brand.
Thus, foreclosure of certain retailers can be more significant than
foreclosure of others, even where the same product is involved. Al-
though there is no way to measure these differences with mathematical
precision, courts should be sensitive to the degree of consumer loyalty
that particular retailers command. There will be cases in which this is a
matter of considerable speculation and of no evidentiary value, but
there will also be cases in which courts can ascertain the degree of con-
sumer loyalty and factor it into the analysis.
b. Wholesalers. Foreclosure of wholesalers typically will have less
impact on competitors trying to reach the ultimate market than foreclo-
sure of retailers. Although consumers customarily travel to retailers in
search of a product, retailers rarely visit the consumer. 86 In contrast,
numerous wholesalers who carry similar products commonly call upon
each retailer. Even if a retailer is exceptionally loyal to a particular
wholesaler, other wholesalers offering the same products are still likely to
approach that retailer. Accordingly, although an exclusive dealing ar-
rangement binding a retailer with loyal customers may well foreclose a
segment of the ultimate consumer market to other suppliers, an exclu-
sive dealing arrangement binding a wholesale distributor is considerably
less likely to foreclose any segment of the ultimate market to other sup-
pliers. Thus, an exclusive dealing arrangement entered into by a sup-
plier with wholesale distributors accounting for twenty-five percent of
sales in a relevant market may not foreclose that market in any way,
provided that other distributors carrying competing goods remain avail-
able. So long as the arrangement does not foreclose competing suppliers
from achieving adequate distribution through other distributors, suppli-
ers will have the opportunity to reach every retailer and consumer in the
relevant market.
Some wholesalers will command a certain degree of loyalty because
of the services they offer or because of personal relationships, and if they
enter into exclusive dealing arrangements they will be able to retain
some of their accounts no matter which brand they offer. But wholesal-
ers sell entirely to retailers, who cannot afford to let loyalties take prior-
ity over profits. Unless there is little brand differentiation in the
particular product, or the product is a relatively unimportant part of a
larger line, it is difficult for a wholesaler to have a "captive" account. As
86 The exceptions are retailers that make door-to-door sales, such as Amway and Fuller
Brush, and retailers that sell directly to consumers through catalogues, such as Sears, Roe-
buck, L.L. Bean, and some of the newer specialty catalogue companies. Of course, other
retailers try to "reach" the consumer at home through advertising in the media.
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a general rule, wholesalers cannot expect their customers to remain with
them without regard to which brands the wholesalers sell.
Clearly, the level of distribution at which exclusive dealing is im-
posed can be very significant. In analyzing foreclosure, the percentage
of sales accounted for by foreclosed wholesalers or retailers should be
discounted by any inability to deliver those sales to an exclusive brand.
2. Tpe of Product
The preclusive effect of exclusive dealing contracts, at least those
involving retailers, cannot be fully understood without distinguishing
among different types of products. Loyalty to a retailer is as much a
function of the type of product as it is a function of the type of retailer.
Some products, because they are durable or expensive, or both, are
known as shopping products. Before purchasing these products consum-
ers tend to shop around and compare brands and prices.8 7 Other prod-
ucts, because they are perishable or inexpensive, or both, are known as
convenience products. 88 Most consumers tend to buy them where they
see them, without much preliminary comparison.8 9
If a product is a shopping product, such as a refrigerator9 0 or a
farm tractor,9 1 consumers usually engage in fairly extensive "search" ac-
tivity.92 They are likely to compare a number of brands and to compare
prices at a number of retail outlets. If an outlet carries only one brand,
consumers are likely to look elsewhere. Accordingly, in the case of a
shopping product, if one supplier enters into exclusive dealing agree-
ments with retailers who historically have accounted for twenty-five per-
cent of sales in an area, there is no guarantee that the retailers can
deliver that twenty-five percent to the particular brand. In fact, there is
no assurance that they will make any sales to customers who would not
have purchased that brand anyway.
The effect of foreclosing retailers of shopping products is illustrated
by United States v. J.I Case Co. 93 The defendant, Case, required retailers
87 See M. PORTER, supra note 18, at 24; F. SCHERER, INDUSRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE
AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 5 n.4 (1980); Note, Restricted Channels of Distribution Under the
Sherman Act, 75 HARV. L. REV. 795 (1962).
88 See M. PORTER, supra note 18, at 24; F. SCHERER, supra note 87; Note, supra note 87.
89 Naturally, these are generalizations. Some consumers will undertake extensive com-
parison shopping for items that most consumers consider convenience products. Likewise,
certain consumers will devote no effort to comparison shopping for products that most would
treat as shopping products. Furthermore, many products do not fit easily into either
category.
90 Cf Refrigeration Eng'g Corp. v. Frick Co., 370 F. Supp. 702, 709 (W.D. Tex. 1974)
(commercial refrigeration equipment distributors have large geographic markets).
91 See United States v. J.I. Case Co., 101 F. Supp. 856 (D. Minn. 1951).
92 MANAGEMENT, supra note 85, at 39; M. PORTER, supra note 18, at 61, 96-113; F.
SCHERER, supra note 87.
93 101 F. Supp. 856 (D. Minn. 1951).
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of its farm machinery to deal exclusively with Case for the products it
manufactured and to discontinue any other brands they had been carry-
ing. Farm machinery is extremely durable. Consumers shop for it care-
fully, and may travel substantial distances to comparison shop.
94
Therefore, the fact that one manufacturer signs a significant number of
retailers to exclusive dealing contracts might have little effect upon the
opportunities for other manufacturers to reach consumers through dif-
ferent retailers. The court found that there had been "no showing that
any farm machinery manufacturer had difficulty in obtaining dealers as
outlets" 95 as a result of Case's exclusive dealing arrangements, and it
dismissed the complaint.
96
Exclusive dealing in convenience products that results in foreclo-
sure of retailers is more likely to cause foreclosure of those retailers' cus-
tomers. For example, a college bookstore that begins to carry only one
brand of looseleaf paper probably will not lose many customers, because
most consumers are likely to treat paper as a convenience product. If
the store begins to carry only one brand of calculators or typewriters, on
the other hand, it is more likely to lose customers because most custom-
ers are likely to treat such items as shopping products, and will not con-
fine their search to that outlet.
In the tavern example described earlier, the neighborhood tavern
can deliver its customers for draft beer not only because of the type of
establishment it is, but because draft beer, being highly perishable and
relatively inexpensive, is not a product for which most consumers com-
parison shop. This ability to deliver customers may help to explain the
decision in Adolph Coors Co. v. FTC 9 7 where the court held that arrange-
ments requiring retailers to deal exclusively in Coors draft beer were
unlawful under the Federal Trade Commission Act.
Likewise, the different results reached in Coors andj.L Case are par-
tially reconcilable on the basis of the different types of products in-
volved; draft beer is a convenience product, whereas farm machinery is
a shopping product. Foreclosing a percentage of draft beer accounts
may well foreclose competitors from that percentage of the ultimate
draft beer market, while binding the same percentage of farm machin-
ery dealers may carry far less assurance of foreclosing competitors from a
comparable segment of the ultimate farm machinery market. A real
problem with the cases, however, is that they fail to articulate these dis-
tinctions or to address the underlying economics, leaving the impression
94 Id at 862-63.
95 Id at 862.
96 Be/tone, by comparison, presented a somewhat unique situation because consumers
commonly had to be convinced that they needed the product in the first place. The Commis-
sion found that there was relatively little comparison shopping. [1979-1983 Transfer Binder]
TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) at 22,379.
97 497 F.2d 1178 (10th Cir. 1974),cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1105 (1975).
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that simple formulations will suffice. 98
The nature of the product becomes unimportant in the case of
wholesalers, it should be noted, because retailers purchasing inventory
items at wholesale generally purchase with considerable deliberation.
There are no convenience products in the eyes of a reseller, and the
effect of foreclosing wholesalers accounting for twenty-five percent of the
sales of a product will not depend upon whether the ultimate consumers
of that product later treat it as a shopping product or a convenience
product. The tavern owner will be as discriminating about purchasing
beer as the farm equipment dealer will be about buying tractors.
In the case of retailers, however, the nature of the product is signifi-
cant, and courts should recognize this in evaluating the foreclosure effect
of exclusive dealing.
99
3. Alternative Channels of Distribution
Taking account of the level of distribution and the type of product
does not end the inquiry when measuring the degree of foreclosure
caused by an exclusive dealing arrangement. Another important con-
sideration is the entirely separate channels of distribution that may be
available to suppliers. For example, one supplier may have an exclusive
dealing agreement with the only wholesaler of a particular product in
an area, yet other suppliers may be able to reach retailers by equipping
other wholesalers to handle the product, by shipping directly to retail
outlets themselves, or by shipping to warehouses owned by retail chains
or cooperatives. 100 At the retail level, suppliers can reach consumers
through retailers who have never handled the product before, as evi-
denced by food stores that have begun selling magazines and
pantyhose.101 Suppliers also may be able to reach consumers directly
through mail order solicitations and door-to-door sales.
Indeed, by developing other channels of distribution, suppliers will
be promoting "intertype competition"---competition among different
98 Another important problem with Coors was that the Tenth Circuit entirely dispensed
with finding the percentage of outlets foreclosed. The court stated flatly that "[aigreements
foreclosing a competitor's products are unlawful," 497 F.2d at 1187, prompting the Commis-
sion in Beltone to question the continued viability of Coors. [1979-1983 Transfer Binder]
TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) at 22,390-91.
99 Cf M. PORTER, supra note 18, at 61 (arguing that where "shopping" goods are in-
volved, percentage of distributors foreclosed is significant "only in extreme cases'.
100 In Joyce Beverages v. Royal Crown Cola Co., 555 F. Supp. 271 (S.D.N.Y. 1983), the
court held that the Seven-Up Company had the "prestige, resources and contacts" to enter
the New York market with a new cola even if foreclosed from contracting with one particular
bottler that was bound to an exclusive dealing arrangement with another company. The
court found that "[t]here are numerous ways in which Seven-Up will be able to enter the New
York market." Id at 278.




modes of distribution. 10 2 This adds a new dimension to competition by
offering customers not only another brand, but another delivery option.
In estimating foreclosure, courts should look beyond the particular
channel of distribution affected and determine whether competitors can
reach the ultimate market through alternative channels.
4. Establishing New Distributors
If a supplier has sufficient financial strength, it can establish a net-
work of entirely new distributors to handle its brand.10 3 Increasing the
total number of distributors will promote competition more than "pig-
gybacking" onto another supplier's existing distributors, because each
distributor will be devoting its full efforts to only one brand. 0 4 If a sup-
plier is in a position to achieve adequate distribution by creating new
distributors, therefore, the degree of foreclosure attributable to any ex-
clusive dealing arrangements between other suppliers and their distribu-
tors must be discounted accordingly.
Thus, in any effort to measure foreclosure, the percentage of distrib-
utors foreclosed and the percentage of sales volume historically ac-
counted for by those distributors merely provide starting points. These
percentages must be examined in light of customer loyalty to the distrib-
utors and the brand, as well as the availability of alternative means of
distribution. Only after considering all of these variables can the an-
ticompetitive effect of an exclusive dealing arrangement be measured.
B. The Procompetitive Effects
A complete analysis of the impact of exclusive dealing arrange-
ments must also consider the procompetitive effects these arrangements
create. Although exclusive dealing, like resale restraints, can promote
interbrand competition, its procompetitive effects differ significantly
from those of resale restraints. As explained above,'0 5 exclusive dealing
does not discourage intrabrand free riding. However, it does encourage
distributors to compete more vigorously, and suppliers to assist them in
these efforts. It may also have certain procompetitive effects in protect-
ing trade secrets and trademarks. Judicial investigations should con-
sider all of these effects, yet to date the cases have only treated them
superficially. The procompetitive effects of exclusive dealing arrange-
ments merit more careful consideration.
1. Stimulating Distributors
Confining the efforts of a distributor to a single brand can promote
102 J. PALAMOUNTAIN, THE ECONOMICS OF DISTRIBUTION 38-48 (1955).
103 See, e.g., Dictograph Prods., Inc., 50 F.T.C. 281, 294 (1953).
104 See infia notes 106-10 and accompanying text.
105 See supra notes 73-74 and accompanying text.
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interbrand competition by encouraging the distributor to devote its
maximum effort to the one brand. An exclusive dealing arrangement
makes the distributor an advocate rather than a mere conduit. When
contacting customers, the distributor can be expected to extol the vir-
tues of that brand because its own success is tied to the brand's success.
Customers are likely to perceive the distributor's carrying of only the
one brand as an endorsement, even if the distributor does little else to
promote the brand.
If a distributor carries a number of brands of the same product, the
distributor becomes more like a clearinghouse; so long as its margins
remain the same, the distributor is indifferent to which brand its cus-
tomers buy. It acts less as an active advocate in the competitive arena
than as a passive onlooker. By carrying competing brands, a distributor
gives the appearance of endorsing them all, and becomes a less credible
advocate for any one of them. In addition, a distributor who carries
more than one brand will not devote its wholehearted efforts to promote
any one brand as vigorously as it would if it dealt in that brand alone.
Its loyalties will be divided, and its efforts on behalf of each brand will
be diluted.
Joyce Beverages v. Royal Crown Co/a Co. 106 illustrates this problem.
The Seven-Up Company, wishing to introduce a new cola called "Like,"
contracted with Joyce Beverages, a New York bottler. Joyce, however,
already was bottling and distributing another cola, Royal Crown, under
what amounted to an exclusive dealing arrangement. Joyce desired to
distribute both brands, and sued for a declaratory judgment that its ex-
clusive dealing contract with Royal Crown was anticompetitive and
therefore unenforceable. The court rejected this argument, holding that
exclusive dealing, which was also being employed by the other major
brands in the market, increased competition because it focused the ef-
forts of each bottler on a single brand.
The court cited several examples of how divided loyalties could be
expected to dilute Joyce's efforts on behalf of Royal Crown if the exclu-
sive dealing requirement were not enforced:
Joyce will control pricing, placement of local advertisements, special
promotions, feature advertising and special displays of the two com-
petitive products. . . . Retailers have been and will be asked to
devote a portion of their limited cola budgets and to edge into their
shelf space a cola product competitive to Royal Crown. In addition,
Joyce will begin seeking and seizing promotional and merchandising
opportunities on behalf of LIKE cola. These activities will necessarily
dilute Joyce's efforts on behalf of the Royal Crown colas.1
0 7
The court also pointed out that Seven-Up's national advertising cam-
106 555 F. Supp. 271 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).
107 Id at 275.
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paign for Like, in which Joyce was expected to participate, claimed that
Like was superior to most other colas, including Royal Crown.
The court expressed concern that if Joyce controlled the distribu-
tion of two competing brands it would become the arbiter of when each
would be promoted or discounted, and for how long and how much.
Joyce testified that it would stagger sales promotions, so that it would
never promote both brands in the same manner at the same time. Al-
though Joyce would face competition from other brands, it would also
be competing against itself, affording the illusion of arm's length compe-
tition between Like and Royal Crown even though such competition
would not really exist. The court quoted an observation made in
Sulmeyer v. Coca-Cola Co., 108 that "[a] bottler with a dual franchise might
be hesitant to strongly promote one cola product over the other, with
competitive detriment to both syrup manufacturers."'' 0 9
The court concluded that competition among Like, Royal Crown,
and the two leading colas, Coca-Cola and Pepsi-Cola, would be better
served if Joyce distributed only one cola, either Like or Royal Crown:
[T]he arrangement that will arise ifJoyce distributes LIKE and Royal
Crown uses another distributor or set of distributors, increases rather
than forecloses competition, as four distributors would then be distrib-
uting four colas. The equivalent will result if Joyce continues to dis-
tribute Royal Crown and Seven-Up uses another distributor or
distributors. Under either situation, there will be the "fierce" inter-
brand competition testified to between Coke, Pepsi, Royal Crown and
LIKE. If both LIKE and Royal Crown were in the hands of Joyce,
these two colas would "never" compete with one another, according
to [a Joyce witness]. 10
Joyce Beverages demonstrates that interbrand competition reaches its
maximum level when each distributor is bound to an exclusive dealing
arrangement and focuses on only one brand, provided there are enough
distributors to go around for every brand and each distributor can stay
in business selling a single brand. Although territorial and customer re-
straints also strengthen interbrand competition between distributors-
by removing the distraction of competition with other distributors of the
same brand-exclusive dealing strengthens those efforts by preventing
the distributors from being distracted by other brands.
108 515 F.2d 835, 840 n.2 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 934 (1976).
109 The Federal Trade Commission made a similar observation in Coca-Cola Co., 91
F.T.C. 517, 637 (1978), vacated, 642 F.2d 1387 (D.C. Cir. 1981). The Commission referred to
piggybacking of several brands by Coca-Cola bottlers as affording only "the image of compe-
tition."
Several other cases have also addressed the problem of divided loyalties. See Brattleboro
Auto Sales, Inc. v. Subaru, Inc., 633 F.2d 649, 651 n.4 (2d Cir. 1980); Business Equip. Center
Ltd. v. DeJur-Amsco Corp., 465 F. Supp. 775, 779-80, 785-86 (D.D.C. 1978); Deltown Foods,
Inc. v. Tropicana Prods., Inc., 219 F. Supp. 887, 890-91 (S.D.N.Y. 1963).




Exclusive dealing not only encourages distributors to compete more
vigorously, it also encourages suppliers to assist distributors in their mar-
keting efforts. Many suppliers invest substantial amounts of money in
strengthening their independent distributors, often providing the capital
for initial start-up costs."' They may provide financing, 112 technical
training, 113 merchandising advice, 1 4 architectural services,115 site selec-
tion, 116 and customer leads. 117 A supplier will be less inclined to pro-
vide this type of assistance if it knows that other suppliers could come
along and "piggyback" their competing products onto the same distrib-
utor, taking a free ride on the investments of the supplier that initially
made that distributor an effective marketer."18
Beltone recognizes that providing incentives for suppliers to under-
write the competitive efforts of their distributors is one of the procompe-
titive effects of exclusive dealing. In Beltone, the supplier engaged in
extensive "lead generation" through national and local promotional ac-
tivity aimed at finding potential customers for its distributors. It would
not have been anxious to forward these leads to its distributors, however,
if the distributors could have offered these customers other brands. The
exclusive dealing requirement eased this concern. The Commission
found that the exclusive dealing restriction had a "rational and efficient
connection" to the supplier's objective of "protect[ing] its invest-
I'' See, e.g., Martin B. Glauser Dodge Co. v. Chrysler Corp., 570 F.2d 72 (3d Cir. 1977),
cert. denied, 436 U.S. 913 (1978); Coleman Motor Co. v. Chrysler Corp., 525 F.2d 1338 (3d Cir.
1975); Rea v. Ford Motor Co., 497 F.2d 577 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 868 (1974); Eng-
land v. Chrysler Corp., 493 F.2d 269 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 869 (1974); Perma Life
Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts Corp., 376 F.2d 692 (7th Cir. 1967), rev'don other grounds,
392 U.S. 134 (1968).
112 See, e.g., Martin B. Glauser Dodge Co. v. Chrysler Corp., 570 F.2d 72 (3d Cir. 1977),
cert. denied, 436 U.S. 913 (1978); Melso v. Texaco, Inc., 532 F. Supp. 1280 (E.D. Pa.) (financ-
ing for retailer's customers), af'd, 696 F.2d 983 (3d Cir. 1982); Mt. Lebanon Motors, Inc. v.
Chrysler Corp., 283 F. Supp. 453 (W.D. Pa. 1968).
'13 See, e.g., Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts Corp., 376 F.2d 692 (7th Cir.
1967), rev'don other grounds 392 U.S. 134 (1968); McAlpine v. AAMCO Automatic Transmis-
sions, Inc., 416 F. Supp. 1232, 1248-51 (W.D. Mich. 1978).
114 See, e.g., FTC v. Brown Shoe Co., 384 U.S. 316, 318 (1966).
115 See, e.g., id.; Principe v. McDonald's Corp., 631 F.2d 303 (4th Cir. 1980), cert. denied,
451 U.S. 970 (1981); Susser v. Carvel Corp., 332 F.2d 505 (2d Cir. 1964), cert. dismissed, 381
U.S. 125 (1965).
116 See, e.g., Ungar v. Dunkin' Donuts of Am., Inc., 531 F.2d 1211 (3d Cir.), cert. denied,
429 U.S. 823 (1976); Martino v. McDonald's Sys., Inc., 81 F.R.D. 81 (N.D. Ill. 1979); In re: 7-
Eleven Franchise Antitrust Litig., 1974-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 75,429 (N.D. Cal. 1974).
117 See Beltone, [1979-1983 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) at 22,376.
118 The first supplier also may anticipate that the distributor intends to market a compet-
ing brand under its own "house" label. See Deltown Foods, Inc. v. Tropicana Prods., Inc.,
219 F. Supp. 887, 890-91 (S.D.N.Y. 1963). The problem of divided loyalties is even more
aggravated in the case of a distributor's own brand because the distributor is likely to make
greater profits on such products and to show greater loyalty to them.
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ment."119
One commentator has argued that encouraging suppliers to invest
is the ono, genuine procompetitive effect of exclusive dealing, and that
exclusive dealing does not result in more efficient marketing efforts on
the part of distributors at all. 120 This assessment, however, ignores the
value of preventing distributors from developing divided loyalties121 and
rests on two questionable assumptions.
First, it assumes that exclusive dealing will result in fewer sales and
lower per unit profit for the distributor, forcing the supplier to lower its
own price in order to compensate the distributor for this loss. In reality,
the distributor's profits may be higher under exclusive dealing, because
its promotional efforts are not diluted among a number of brands and
its total sales may therefore be greater.
Second, it assumes that if the promotional services of distributors of
one brand were superior to those of multiline distributors, distributors
would adopt exclusive dealing voluntarily. Exclusive dealing, however,
makes the distributor dependent on one supplier, and although it might
actually maximize the profits of both the distributor and the supplier,
this dependence makes exclusive dealing unappealing to distributors.
Although there are notable exceptions, distributors rarely adopt exclu-
sive dealing as a marketing strategy voluntarily. More often exclusive
dealing is a function of limited space or facilities-as when a neighbor-
hood delicatessen has room to carry only one brand of ketchup-or a
function of the distributor's inability to find more than one supplier
willing to grant it distribution rights. If a distributor is newly formed, or
if the brand itself is new, the future will be too uncertain for the distrib-
utor to forego sales of other brands voluntarily. If the distributor is al-
ready established, it probably will consider it too risky to switch to
exclusive dealing voluntarily, even though it may achieve more success
in the long run by carrying only one brand.
The argument that stimulation of suppliers' efforts is the only
procompetitive effect of exclusive dealing cannot be accepted in light of
these factors.122 Nonetheless, it is correct to point out that the effect of
exclusive dealing arrangements on suppliers' efforts can be extremely
significant. 123 In the absence of exclusive dealing, suppliers are more
likely to allow distributors to sink or swim on their own, rather than
spend money to strengthen a distributor who can then serve other sup-
pliers who have not made similar investments.
No supplier wants to bankroll a distribution network for its compet-
119 Beltone, [1979-1983 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) at 22,398.
120 Marvel, supra note 56, at 4-5.
121 See supra notes 107-09 and accompanying text.
122 See supra note 120 and accompanying text.
123 See Marvel, supra note 56.
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itors. A supplier who finances and trains a distributor, without requir-
ing that distributor to deal exclusively in its brand, allows a competing
supplier to sit back and take a free ride simply by having the distributor
add its brand for sale as well. The free-riding supplier can also take a
number of affirmative steps to dilute further the distributors promo-
tional efforts on behalf of the original supplier's brand by "buying" the
distributor's loyalty. These steps, designed to shift some of the expense of
promotion from the distributor back onto the supplier, are the same
steps a supplier would take to induce any nonexclusive distributor to
push its brand.
First, the free-riding supplier can lower its prices to offer the distrib-
utor a higher margin. Distributors will devote more effort to selling
brands on which they stand to make a greater profit. Not uncommonly,
a supplier in these circumstances will invest in little or no "pull" adver-
tising-advertising designed to pull consumers into the retail outlets in
search of that specific brand. Instead, the supplier will keep prices to its
distributors low and rely on them to "push" the brand to consumers. 1
24
A related technique is the sales contest. These contests do not lower
prices to the distributors directly, but instead offer a cash or merchan-
dise bonus to distributors who exceed their sales quotas. Distributors
may promote the free-riding supplier's brand over the original supplier's
brand in hope of earning the reward. Alternatively, the free-riding sup-
plier may pay a bonus directly to the distributors' sales representatives
or sales managers.
125
Free-riding suppliers can also encourage distributor promotion by
paying for it directly through cooperative advertising, promotional pay-
ments, or outright provision of promotional materials. Cooperative ar-
rangements encourage the distributor to commit its own funds to
promote those brands that provide matching funds. An attractive coop-
erative arrangement will be difficult to pass up, even though it will re-
quire the distributor to spend some of its own money. direct provision of
promotional material is even more likely to be utilized. If a supplier
gives a distributor displays, samples, banners, leaflets, signs, videotaped
sales presentations, or live demonstrators, the distributor is likely to use
these to promote the brand because such promotion requires little or no
additional cost.
126
124 This can manifest itself in "bait and switch" sales techniques at the retail level, with
the original supplier's lower-margin product as the "bait" and the free riding supplier's
higher-margin product as the "switch."
125 M. PORTER, supra note 18, at 33 n.46.
126 Alternatively, a supplier relying on distributors that carry other brands can attempt
to overcome the dilemma of nonexclusivity by appealing directly to the distributors' custom-
ers through advertising and other means rather than by paying to encourage the distributor
to promote. At the wholesale level, a supplier can hire advocates of its own in the form of
"detail men," "presellers," or sales representatives of any other name, to try to convince retail-
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All these methods help a free-riding supplier to encourage a distrib-
utor to devote more effort to promoting its brand and less to promoting
other brands. Instead of finding its own distributor-resulting in two
faithful advocates for two brands-the free-riding supplier divides the
loyalties and promotional efforts of one distributor between the two
brands. This discourages the original supplier's assistance to the distrib-
utor and probably discourages that supplier from helping to establish
other distributors in the future.
One might argue that if a supplier can encourage distributors to
promote its brand by employing all of the different incentives described
above, it really does not need to impose exclusive dealing in the first
place. This overlooks the fact that none of these incentives can totally
overcome the impact of divided loyalty. Furthermore, none of them will
convince a supplier to give its unqualified support to a distributor in the
way that exclusive dealing does. Finally, none of these incentives re-
quires an investment on the part of the supplier in the competitive effec-
tiveness of the distributor itself, rather than the supplier's brand.
Of course, underlying the procompetitive effects of exclusive deal-
ing is the need for enough distributors to serve every supplier. If an
exclusive dealing arrangement significantly forecloses other suppliers,
the arrangement may inhibit, rather than promote interbrand competi-
tion. 127 On balance, however, if exclusive dealing does not significantly
foreclose other brands from reaching the market, one may expect it to
increase interbrand competition.
3. Other Procompetitive Effects
Wholly apart from the procompetitive effects on distributors' mar-
keting efforts and on supplier support for distributors, exclusive dealing
arrangements may also be necessary to protect trade secrets or licensed
trademarks. As the Commission emphasized in Beltone, any "reasonable
justifications" for exclusive dealing must be taken into account.'
28
a. Protection of Trade Secrets. Exclusive dealing arrangements can
prevent distributors from misappropriating confidential supplier infor-
mation and using it to market competing brands. Suppliers often give
distributors access to a wealth of confidential information including in-
dispensable trade secrets, such as recipes and formulas. Some of the in-
ers to buy its brand from the distributors. This may be a difficult task, because retailers may
lack the patience to grant an audience to another species of salesman for the same brand that
the distributors carry. At the retail level the supplier can engage in advertising, offer free
samples by mail, or use other techniques to build consumer demand directly.
127 See, e.g., Standard Fashion Co. v. Margane Houston Co., 258 U.S. 346, 357 (1922)
(exclusive dealing arrangement may substantially lessen competition in both large cities and
small towns with few outlets).
128 [1979-1983 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) at 22,391.
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formation is strategic, such as timetables for new promotional programs,
and some instructive, such as technical training information or the re-
sults of consumer surveys. In addition, some of it is of immediate value
to competitors, such as the actual customer leads described in Beltone.129
The misappropriation of a supplier's trade secrets for the benefit of
other brands is actually a variation of the interbrand free-riding de-
scribed above. 130 Although suppliers normally have considerable lee-
way in deciding how much to spend in assisting distributors to become
stronger competitors, most suppliers must share at least some confiden-
tial information in order to do any business through a distributor. Ac-
cordingly, although a supplier can promote its products directly to
consumers and limit its financial support to distributors with divided
loyalties, it may have little choice in disclosing confidential information
to those distributors. Exclusive dealing arrangements can provide the
most reliable method to prevent such information from benefiting com-
peting brands.
In Joyce Beverages v. Royal Crown Co/a Co., 131 the court recognized
that an example of the conflicts the bottler would face if it tried to dis-
tribute both Royal Crown Cola and Like cola was "the need to keep
each one's market strategies confidential."' 132 The court concluded that
exclusive dealing would prevent this dilemma and upheld the exclusive
dealing arrangement at least partially for this reason. Similarly, other
cases have suggested that exclusive dealing arrangements can have the
long-run procompetitive effect of protecting trade secrets.'
33
b. Quality Control The Supreme Court specifically pointed out in
Sylvania that the acceptable justifications for vertical restraints include
not only marketing efficiencies, such as eliminating the free-rider effect,
but also quality control efficiencies:
Marketing efficiency is not the only legitimate reason for a manufac-
turer's desire to exert control over the manner in which his products
are sold and serviced. As a result of statutory and common-law devel-
opments, society increasingly demands that manufacturers assume di-
rect responsibility for the safety and quality of their products.'
3 4
129 See supra note 119 and accompanying text.
130 See supra notes 119-27 and accompanying text.
131 555 F. Supp. 271 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).
132 Id at 276.
133 Esposito v. Mister Softee, Inc., 1980-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 63,089, at 77,422-23
(E.D.N.Y. 1979) (finding exclusive dealing clause unnecessary because franchisor's product
not based on secret formula); cf. National Football League v. North Am. Soccer League, 103
S. Ct. 499, 502 (1982) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) (procompetitive
effect of rules prohibiting NFL team owner from owning other sports team "does not appear
[to be] . . . outweighed by their negative effects on competition.").
134 Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 55 n.23 (1977); accord Na-
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Even before Sylvania, in Susser v. Carvel Corp., 135 the Second Circuit
pointed out that among the "economic justifications" that would satisfy
the requirements of Tampa Electric was protection of a trademark by a
licensor: "Trademark licensing agreements requiring the sole use of the
trademarked item have withstood attack under the antitrust laws where
deemed reasonably necessary to protect the goodwill interest of the
trademark owner .... -136
Federal law requires a trademark owner that licenses its trademark
to exercise control over the quality of the trademarked goods produced
and distributed by its licensees. 137 If a distributor manufactures the li-
censed product in whole or in part, such as a Carvel soft ice cream
store, 138 a Chock Full 0' Nuts coffee shop1 39, or a Dawn Donut Shop, 140
quality control is easier to maintain if the distributor is limited to selling
only the one brand. Substitution of unauthorized ingredients presents a
continuing concern in such situations; 141 if a licensed manufacturer-dis-
tributor handles other brands, it will always have a variety of ingredi-
ents on hand, making policing more difficult for the licensor.
If an exclusive dealing arrangement provides an effective means for
exercising the required quality control, a court or the FTC may uphold
it even though it results in a significant foreclosure of competition. Al-
though some trademark owners monitor quality without exclusive deal-
ing clauses, the FTC has held that a supplier need not employ the least
restrictive alternative so long as the restraint is reasonable. 142 Courts
should recognize that in the context of trademark licensing, the effi-
ciency effects of exclusive dealing can promote long-run interbrand
competition even if there is significant foreclosure.
143
tional Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 688, 696 n.22 (1978); Trip-
oli Co. v. Wella Corp., 425 F.2d 932, 938 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 831 (1970).
135 332 F.2d 505, 516 (2d Cir. 1964), cert. dismissed, 381 U.S. 125 (1965).
136 Id at 517.
137 Dawn Donut Co. v. Hart's Food Stores, Inc., 267 F.2d 358, 365-66 (2d Cir. 1959); see
Note, Quality Control and the Antitrut Laws in Trademark Licensing, 72 YALE L.J. 1171, 1186-93,
1198-99 (1963); cf. Pike v. Ruby Foo's Den, Inc., 232 F.2d 683 (D.C. Cir. 1956) (licensor of
restaurant name retained revocation rights and ownership of the name by revocation clause
in licensing agreement and involvement in maintaining quality at licensee's restaurant);
Philip Morris, Inc. v. Imperial Tobacco Co., 251 F. Supp. 362, 379 (E.D. Va. 1965) (antitrust
violations and British licensor's lack of involvement with or relation to American licensee
justified court order stripping British licensor of trademark rights in United States for trade-
marks licensed to American manufacturer), af'd, 401 F.2d 179 (4th Cir. 1968) cert. denied, 393
U.S. 1094 (1969).
138 Susser v. Carvel Corp., 332 F.2d 505, 517 (2d Cir. 1964), cert. dismirsed, 381 U.S. 125
(1965).
139 Chock Full 0' Nuts Corp., 83 F.T.C. 575 (1973).
140 See, e.g., Dawn Donut Co. v. Hart's Food Stores, Inc., 267 F.2d 358 (2d Cir. 1959).
141 Id at 367.
142 See szpra note 44 and accompanying text.
143 Where patent licensing is involved instead of trademark licensing, restrictions against
a licensed manufacturer producing competing goods comes in for much harsher treatment
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c. Duration. In Beltone, the Commission stated that one other fac-
tor that must be considered in an assessment of exclusive dealing is the
duration of the agreement. 144 The Commission observed that one of the
reasons exclusive dealing has been treated rather leniently under the an-
titrust laws is that most exclusive dealing arrangements are of relatively
short duration and are easily terminable. 145 The Commission referred
to Professor Sullivan's assertion that "the longer the exclusive dealing
arrangement, the more likely it is that its restrictiveness outweighs any
efficiencies or justifications associated with it."146
This appears to be an overstatement. Naturally, an exclusive deal-
ing arrangement that expires after one year is less restrictive than an
otherwise identical agreement which expires after two years. It does not
follow, however, that arrangements of longer duration are always likely
to be less procompetitive. A one-year foreclosure of a substantial
number of end-users, for example, may be far more restrictive of inter-
brand competition than a perpetual foreclosure of a limited group of
distributors.
CONCLUSION
In Beltone the Commission instructed that the "dynamic nature of
the market" must be taken into account along with market share data in
assessing the legality of an exclusive dealing arrangement. This article
has attempted to give some content to the concept of market dynamics
in the context of distribution.
The most important dynamic that emerges is loyalty-loyalty of
consumers, of distributors, and of suppliers. The anticompetitive effect
of foreclosing a particular percentage of distributors will vary signifi-
cantly with the two factors that influence consumer loyalty-the distri-
bution level and the product type. Other dynamics affecting foreclosure
are the availability of alternative channels of distribution and the poten-
tial for creating new distributors.
The principal procompetitive dynamics of exclusive dealing are the
degree of distributor loyalty to the brand and the degree of supplier
loyalty to the distributor. These loyalties are measured by how much
more intensely the distributors and the suppliers each compete against
other brands as a result of the exclusive dealing arrangement. Exclusive
because the licensor is not required to monitor the quality of products sold under its name.
See, e.g., Stewart v. Mo-Trim, Inc., 192 U.S.P.Q. 410 (S.D. Ohio 1975).
144 [1979-1983 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) at 22,391.
145 Id
146 Id. at 22,391 n.39 (citing L. SULLIVAN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ANTITRUST 485-
86 (1977)); see also Bok, supra note 23, at 302-03. On the other hand, the Commission also
recognized that the restriction in Tampa Electric was for 20 years and in Be/tone itself the
restriction had no time limitations, although the dealership contracts were terminable by
either party on 30 days' notice.
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dealing enhances both. Other market dynamics that generate procom-
petitive effects involve the safeguarding of confidential information and
assurance of quality control in trademark licensing situations.
These market dynamics are far more complex than are simple per-
centages of distributors or sales volume foreclosed. Only by recognizing
and accounting for these dynamics can courts measure the procompeti-
tive and anticompetitive effects of exclusive dealing with any assurance
of accuracy. Courts should focus on the percentages of foreclosure as the
starting points of any inquiry, but, unless the application of these per-
centages is tempered with the considerations discussed above, it will not
provide an adequate basis for determining legality.
